



CANADA

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Incident Response Groupe

Groupe d'intervention en cas d'incident

М И - 7 0

Minutes

A meeting of the Incident Response Group was held at the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, on Thursday, February 10, 2022, at 4:00 p.m.

MEMCO

Procès-verbal

Une réunion du Groupe d'intervention en cas d'incident a eu lieu au Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, le jeudi 10 février 2022 à 16h00.

16h00.

P R I V Y C O U N C I L

DOCUMENT CONFIDENTIAL DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ DE LA REINE

	<u>Présent</u>		<u>Étaient présents</u>	
C	The Prime Minister		Le Premier ministre	D
O	(Mr. Trudeau),		(M. Trudeau),	O
N	in the Chair,		Président,	C
F	The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance		La vice-première ministre et ministre des Finances	U
I	(Ms. Freeland),		(Mme Freeland),	M
D	The Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Infrastructure and Communities		Le ministre des Affaires Intergouvernementales, de l'Infrastructure et des Collectivités	N
E	(Mr. LeBlanc),		(M. LeBlanc),	T
N	The President of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada and Minister of Emergency Preparedness		Le président du Conseil privé de la Reine pour le Canada et ministre de la Protection civile	O
C	* (Mr. Blair),		* (M. Blair),	N
E	The Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada		Le ministre de la Justice et procureur général du Canada	D
O	* (Mr. Lametti),		* (M. Lametti),	E
F	The Minister of Public Safety		Le ministre de la Sécurité publique	N
T	(Mr. Mendicino),		(M. Mendicino),	T
H	The Minister of National Defence		La ministre de la Défense nationale	I
E	* (Ms. Anand),		* (Mme Anand),	E
	The Minister of Transport		Le ministre des Transports	L
	(Mr. Alghabra),		(M. Alghabra),	
				D
	* Secure device		* Appareil sécurisé	U
Q	<u>Also present</u>		<u>Étaient aussi présents</u>	C
U	Mr. J. Innes		Mr. J. Innes	O
E	(Office of the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Infrastructure and Communities),		(Cabinet du ministre des Affaires Intergouvernementales, de l'Infrastructure et des Collectivités),	N
E	Ms. L. Church		Mme L. Church	S
N	(Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance),		(Cabinet de la vice-première ministre et ministre des Finances),	E
,	Mr. A. Steinhouse		M. A. Steinhouse	I
S	(Office of the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada),		(Cabinet du ministre de la Justice et procureur général du Canada),	L
P	Mr. M. Maka		M. M. Maka	P
R	(Office of the Minister of Transport),		(Cabinet du ministre des Transports),	R
I	Mr. M. Power		M. M. Power	I
V	Mr. M. Menouar		M. M. Menouar	V
Y	(Office of the Minister of National Defense),		(Cabinet de la ministre de la Défense nationale),	É
	Ms. Z. Astravas		Mme Z. Astravas	D
C	(Office of the President of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada and Minister of Emergency Preparedness),		(Cabinet du président du Conseil privé de la Reine pour le Canada et ministre de la Protection civile),	E
O	Mr. F. Daigle		M. F. Daigle	L
U	(Justice Canada),		(Justice Canada),	A
N	Mr. M. Keenan		M. M. Keenan	R
N	(Transport Canada),		(Transports Canada),	E
C	Mr. R. Stewart		M. R. Stewart	I
I	(Public Safety Canada),		(Sécurité publique Canada),	N
L	Mr. W. Eyre		M. W. Eyre	E
	Mr. B. Matthews		M. B. Matthews	
	(National Defence),		(Défense nationale),	
	Mr. T. Gallivan		M. T. Gallivan	
	(Canadian Revenue Agency),		(Agence du revenu du Canada),	

<u>Also present (Cont'd)</u>		<u>Étaient aussi présents (suite)</u>	
C	Mr. D. Vignault (Canadian Security Intelligence Service),	M. D. Vignault (Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité),	D
O	Ms. B. Lucki (Royal Canadian Mounted Police),	Mme B. Lucki (Gendarmerie royale du Canada),	O
N	Ms. K. Telford	Mme K. Telford	C
I	Mr. B. Clow	M. B. Clow	U
D	Mr. J. Brodhead	M. J. Brodhead	M
E	Ms. S. Khalil	Mme S. Khalil	E
N	Mr. B. Chin	Mr. B. Chin	N
C	Mr. P. Proulx	M. P. Proulx	O
E	Mr. C. Ahmed (Prime Minister's Office),	M. C. Aïmed (Cabinet du premier ministre),	N
	Mr. K. Mackillop	M. K. Mackillop	F
	Ms. L. Setlakwe	Mme L. Setlakwe	I
	Ms. J. Bogden	Mme J. Bogden	D
O	Mr. M. Vandergrift	M. M. Vandergrift	E
F	Mr. M. MacDonald	M. M. MacDonald	N
	Mr. J. Hutchison	M. J. Hutchison	T
	Ms. L. Baird	Mme L. Baird	H
	Mr. D. MacGillivray	M. D. MacGillivray	E
	Ms. N. Boilard (Privy Council Office),	Mme N. Boilard (Bureau du Conseil privé),	L
	Interim Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet (Ms. J. Charette).	La greffière intérimaire du Conseil privé et secrétaire du Cabinet (Mme J. Charette).	U
Q	The Deputy Clerk and Associate Secretary to the Cabinet (Ms. N. Drouin).	La Sous-greffière et secrétaire associée du Cabinet (Mme N. Drouin).	C
E			O
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N			S
,	National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister (Ms. J. Thomas).	Conseillère à la sécurité nationale et au renseignement auprès du Premier ministre (Mme J. Thomas).	E
S			L
P	<u>Secretary</u>	<u>Secrétaire</u>	P
R	Mr. S. Tupper (Privy Council Office).	M. S. Tupper (Bureau du Conseil privé).	R
I			I
V	<u>Recording Secretary</u>	<u>Secrétaire de séance</u>	V
Y			E
	Ms. S. Sortland (Privy Council Office).	Mme S. Sortland (Bureau du Conseil privé).	D
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SECRET

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**INCIDENT
RESPONSE
GROUP**

ORDRE DU JOUR

February 10, 2022
4:00 p.m. – 6:00 p.m.

Le 10 février 2022
16h00 – 18h00

Secure VTC and In-Person

Vidéoconférence sécurisée et en personne

AGENDA

ORDRE DU JOUR

1. Situation Overview

1. Aperçu de la situation
2. Specific Actions at Key Locations
 - a. Actions available & authorities
 - b. Additional options & requirements

2. Mesures particulières à des endroits clés
 - a. Actions disponibles & autorités
 - b. Actions et exigences supplémentaires
3. Other Disincentives


3. Autres facteurs dissuasifs
4. Communications

4. Communications
5. Wrap-up

5. Conclusion

Opening Remarks

COAPCC



Situation Overview

The National Security and Intelligence Advisor provided an overview of the current situation.

In Ottawa, the situation remains largely unchanged. As of February 10th, 10 new trucks departed, 25 arrests made, 126 open investigations, and 1550 tickets issued. The Ottawa 911 call centre was shut down as a result of prank calls. Threats on social media persist and it continues to be used as a planning tool, with the possibility of driving by Sussex Drive and driving by local schools discussed. The RCMP Commissioner added that engagement continues with the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) and Ottawa Police Service (OPS). The RCMP has provided all resources requested by the OPS. OPP resources have also been provided and there is good cooperation between the OPP and RCMP. There are indications that some protesters would like to leave but are unable to do so given physical barriers. An integrated planning cell is developing a plan of action and the preference remains to continue moving forward with negotiations, with enforcement actions to start early next week if negotiations remain unsuccessful. A surge and contain strategy will be employed for the upcoming weekend.

In Alberta, the situation also remains largely unchanged, with migration occurring to a different designated location. One lane is open in both directions. The RCMP Commissioner added that enforcement continues with significant fines. A pastor who incited some protesters to remain at the primary location was arrested. The number of protesters had dropped from 250 to 40; however, those remaining are firmly entrenched in their views, and there are weapons on site. Coutts is unable to get tow trucks to assist in enforcement; all those approached have refused to help. The Commissioner noted that RCMP contract policing officers are being deployed to the area from within the province and from BC.

In Manitoba, at Emerson there is a 1.5km blockade. The RCMP Commissioner noted that plainclothes officers are monitoring the situation. There have been discussions about allowing shipments of animals to cross the border, and some shipments have gone through. She noted that Emerson is not as busy as other PoEs.

At the Ambassador Bridge, following the first arrest for dangerous driving, behaviour is becoming more aggressive.

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Bluewater remains at play. New Brunswick and Nova Scotia have invoked their Emergencies Acts.

In Northwest Territories there are rumours of blockades with the Alberta border. In British Columbia there are unconfirmed rumours of two convoys.

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[REDACTED]

The Minister of Public Safety indicated that we are seeing an increase in systematic targeting and coordination rather than ad hoc protests. Despite best efforts, security has not yet been restored including at the border (Ambassador Bridge, Emerson, Coutts).

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[REDACTED]

The Minister indicated that the Mayor of Windsor remains cautiously optimistic and has advised that enforcement actions will begin shortly. There is a broader challenge with law enforcement, some of whom may be sympathetic to the protesters' cause, resulting in reluctance to enforce.

[REDACTED]

The Commissioner of the RCMP indicated that Windsor remains the number one priority. As of 15:15 hours on February 10th there were 250 people and 100 vehicles. 100 OPP officers were on-site and 36 Windsor police officers. The Commissioner confirmed that the OPP has taken over incident command. The RCMP has deployed a public order team which will arrive tonight. There is a plan in place that will see protesters removed tomorrow morning.

Canada Border Services Agency reported that at the Ambassador Bridge, protesters appear focused on inbound traffic rather than border crossing. It has not affected staff being able to work at the Port of Entry (POE).

[REDACTED]

Specific Actions at Key Locations

The Prime Minister set up the conversation to discuss two possible tracks:
1) actions that could be taken under existing authorities, and 2) the process of invoking the Emergencies Act.

COAPCC

Public Safety Canada reported on a conversation with the lead

negotiator (OPP) who noted that in Ottawa, approximately 80% of protestors had a weak connection to the cause, 5% had a strong devotion to it, and 15% were a swing factor. The negotiator suggested that the leaders of the protest could potentially be encouraged to leave and denounce the blockade in exchange for a commitment to register their message with the

Government. CAPCC
CAPCC

[REDACTED]

The Minister of Emergency Preparedness and President of the Queen's Privy Council reminded participants that this is not the first significant protest to take place in Canada

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[REDACTED]

in areas like Coutts and Windsor, police capacity was exceeded almost

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immediately. CAPCC

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Other Disincentives

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[REDACTED]

Communications

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Wrap-Up


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