{"id":2758,"date":"2018-04-05T00:27:07","date_gmt":"2018-04-05T00:27:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ccla.org\/?p=2758"},"modified":"2021-06-13T00:33:56","modified_gmt":"2021-06-13T00:33:56","slug":"declaration-de-la-societe-civile-concernant-le-projet-de-loi-c-59","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ccla.org\/fr\/uncategorized\/civil-society-statement-regarding-bill-c-59\/","title":{"rendered":"D\u00e9claration de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 civile concernant le projet de loi C-59"},"content":{"rendered":"\n\t\t
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CIVIL SOCIETY STATEMENT REGARDING BILL C-59, AN ACT RESPECTING NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

Bill C-59 was explicitly introduced with the claim that it fixes \u201cthe problematic aspects\u201d of its predecessor, Bill C-51\u2014now Canada\u2019s\u00a0Anti-terrorism Act, 2015<\/em>.<\/p>\n

We, the undersigned civil society organizations and individual experts, are concerned that C-59 does not truly fix all of the problems with our current national security law, and it has introduced some very serious new issues.<\/p>\n

The Bill was referred to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (SECU) after first reading, which leaves open the possibility for amendments. SECU has had the opportunity to hear from many of us, and many others, about where Bill C-59 falls short, where it oversteps, and how it can be improved to ensure that it takes a rights-centric approach to national security. The coming days and weeks are a crucial time to speak out. \u00a0As Bill C-59 moves through Parliament our government needs to hear from those who think that Canada deserves better and that this legislation can and must protect national security while firmly and unequivocally upholding human rights.<\/p>\n

There is consensus amongst civil liberties and human rights organizations about some of the most troubling aspects of Bill C-59. Our concerns focus on: 1) the bill\u2019s empowerment of our national security agencies to conduct mass surveillance; 2) the practical impossibility of an individual effectively challenging their inclusion on the \u201cno-fly list\u201d; and 3) the authorization of Canada\u2019s signals intelligence agency, CSE, to conduct cyberattacks. While these by no means represent the only problems with Bill C-59 that require \u201cfixes\u201d, they are among the areas where change is both urgently required and most broadly supported.<\/p>\n

Authorizing Mass Surveillance<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

We acknowledge the increase in oversight and review that may be achieved with the creation of a National Security Intelligence Review Agency and an Intelligence Commissioner. However, Bill C-59 also expressly empowers mass surveillance through the collection of bulk data and \u201cpublicly available\u201d data \u2013 a term that is not clearly defined in the bill in relation to datasets collected by our human intelligence agency, CSIS, and extraordinarily expansively defined for the CSE. \u00a0In both cases, \u201cpublicly available\u201d is open to interpretations that are as sweeping as they are troubling. In particular, there is no requirement that publicly available information must have been lawfully obtained. In the absence of effective limits in the law, the bodies that have been set up to improve accountability may review or oversee mass surveillance activities, but not necessarily prevent or limit them. The bill also lowers the threshold to allow CSIS to collect information about Canadians \u2013 even data that is expressly acknowledged to not relate directly and immediately to activities threatening the security of Canada\u2013if it is \u201crelevant,\u201d rather than restricting collection to information that is necessary. There has been little meaningful debate on whether this lower threshold is necessary or reasonable in light of the goals the government seeks to achieve.<\/p>\n

Secret trials with secret evidence for individuals on the \u201cno fly\u201d list<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

The no-fly list has never been shown to increase aviation safety. Bill C-59 perpetuates a scheme that severely limits rights based on a mere suspicion of dangerousness that cannot be effectively challenged in a fair and open process. The government\u2019s proposed redress system for those mistakenly on a list of people subject to enhanced security screening (\u201cslow fly list\u201d) does not assist those who are simply prohibited from flying. These individuals face a process in which they can legally be denied information relevant to their case, can be denied access to their own hearing and have no right to an independent special advocate with access to all of the evidence against them. SECU has already recommended a number of changes to the no-fly list including the use of Special Advocates. Some of us, and others, \u00a0have gone further, and argued for the repeal of the \u201cno fly\u201d system completely. Successive governments have allowed this system to endure for over a decade, and it is imperative that the fundamental rights issues it poses be acknowledged and addressed.<\/p>\n

Legalizing Cyberattacks by \u201cCanada\u2019s NSA\u201d, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE)<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

We are seeing our \u201cintelligence\u201d agencies transformed in dangerous directions. C-59 continues to allow CSIS active \u201cdisruption\u201d powers and now also gives the CSE new powers to use cyber-attacks against foreign individuals, states, organizations or terrorist groups. \u00a0This would include hacking, deploying malware, and \u201cdisinformation campaigns\u201d. There is a significant danger of normalizing state-sponsored hacking, not to mention the obvious tension when the agency mandated with protecting our cyber infrastructure is also powerfully incentivized to hide and hoard security vulnerabilities for its own attack exploits. \u00a0We need a public discussion about what threats these attack powers are meant to address and what new threats they may open us up to if a Canadian attack results in cyberwar escalation.<\/p>\n

Canadians were told that the new law would \u201cfix\u201d the old law. \u00a0Instead, we got a bill that nominally addresses some concerns, but exploits the opportunity to introduce more radical new powers for national security agencies.<\/p>\n

If the goal of Bill C-59 is truly to \u201cfix\u201d Canada\u2019s national security laws, there is still much work to be done.<\/p>\n

Signed by (alphabetical order):<\/em><\/p>\n

Amnesty International Canada
\nBC Civil Liberties Association
\nBC Freedom of Information and Privacy Association
\nCanadian Association of University Teachers
\nCanadian Civil Liberties Association
\nCanadian Federation of Students
\nCanadian Journalists for Free Expression
\nCanadian Union of Postal Workers
\nIndependent Jewish Voices Canada
\nInternational Civil Liberties Monitoring Group
\nInter Pares
\nLawyers\u2019 Rights Watch Canada
\nLigue des droits et libert\u00e9s
\nMiningWatch Canada
\nNational Council of Canadian Muslims
\nNational Union of Public and General Employees (NUPGE)
\nOpenMedia
\nPrivacy and Access Council of Canada \u2014\u00a0Conseil du Canada de l\u2019Acc\u00e8s et la vie Priv\u00e9e
\nRideau Institute
\nRocky Mountain Civil Liberties Association
\nSamuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy & Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC)<\/p>\n

As Individuals:<\/em><\/p>\n

Elizabeth Block, Independent Jewish Voices, Canadian Friends Service Committee
\nJames L. Turk, Director, Centre for Free Expression, Ryerson University
\nSharon Polsky, MAPP, Data Protection Advocate & Privacy by Design Ambassador
\nSid Shniad, Member of the national steering committee, Independent Jewish Voices Canada<\/p>\n

To add your voice and send this message to parliamentarians,\u00a0click here.<\/a><\/strong>
\nFor more information on Bill C-59,\u00a0click here<\/a>.\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\t\t\t<\/div> \n\t\t<\/div>\n\t<\/div> \n<\/div><\/div>\n\t\t

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La version fran\u00e7aise suit.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n

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D\u00c9<\/strong>CLARATION DE LA SOCI<\/strong>\u00c9T\u00c9 CIVILE\u00a0<\/strong>SUR LE PROJET DE LOI C-59, LOI CONCERNANT DES QUESTIONS DE S<\/strong>\u00c9CURIT\u00c9 NATIONALE<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

Le gouvernement canadien a d\u00e9pos\u00e9 le projet de loi C-59 en affirmant explicitement que ce dernier est une solution aux \u00abaspects probl\u00e9matiques\u00bb de son pr\u00e9d\u00e9cesseur, le projet de loi C-51 \u2014 maintenant la Loi antiterroriste de 2015.<\/p>\n

Nous, les organisations de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 civile et les expert.es individuel.les soussign\u00e9.es, sommes pr\u00e9occup\u00e9.es par le fait que le projet de loi C-59 non seulement ne r\u00e8gle pas tous les probl\u00e8mes li\u00e9s \u00e0 la l\u00e9gislation actuelle sur la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale, mais il introduit aussi des nouveaux probl\u00e8mes tr\u00e8s s\u00e9rieux.<\/p>\n

Le projet de loi a \u00e9t\u00e9 renvoy\u00e9 au Comit\u00e9 permanent de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 publique et nationale de la Chambre des communes (SECU) apr\u00e8s la premi\u00e8re lecture, laissant la porte ouverte \u00e0 d\u2019importants amendements. SECU a eu l\u2019occasion d\u2019entendre plusieurs d\u2019entre nous, et beaucoup d\u2019autres, au sujet du projet de loi C-59 : ses lacunes, comment il d\u00e9passe les limites et comment il peut \u00eatre am\u00e9lior\u00e9 afin d\u2019assurer une approche de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale centr\u00e9e sur les droits. Les jours et les semaines \u00e0 venir sont une p\u00e9riode cruciale pour faire entendre nos voix. Pendant que le projet de loi C-59 progresse au Parlement, notre gouvernement doit \u00e9couter ceux et celles qui pensent que le Canada m\u00e9rite mieux et que cette loi peut et doit prot\u00e9ger la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale tout en respectant fermement et sans \u00e9quivoque les droits de la personne.<\/p>\n

Les organisations de d\u00e9fense des droits humains et des libert\u00e9s civiles s\u2019entendent sur les aspects les plus troublants du projet de loi C-59. Nos pr\u00e9occupations portent sur : 1) la l\u00e9galisation de la surveillance de masse; 2) l\u2019impossibilit\u00e9 pratique pour un individu de contester efficacement son inclusion sur la \u00abliste d\u2019interdiction de vol\u00bb; et 3) l\u2019autorisation de lancer des cyberattaques donn\u00e9e \u00e0 l\u2019agence de renseignement \u00e9lectronique du Canada, le CST. Bien que ces trois points ne repr\u00e9sentent en aucun cas les seuls probl\u00e8mes li\u00e9s au projet de loi C-59 n\u00e9cessitant des \u00abcorrectifs\u00bb, ils font partie des domaines o\u00f9 le changement est \u00e0 la fois urgent et le plus largement soutenu.<\/p>\n

Autorisation de la surveillance de masse<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

Nous reconnaissons qu\u2019une augmentation de la responsabilisation en mati\u00e8re de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale pourrait \u00eatre r\u00e9alis\u00e9e gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 la cr\u00e9ation du poste de Commissaire au renseignement ainsi que de l\u2019Office de surveillance des activit\u00e9s en mati\u00e8re de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale et de renseignement. Cependant, le projet de loi C-59 autorise express\u00e9ment la surveillance de masse par la collecte de donn\u00e9es en vrac et de donn\u00e9es \u00abaccessibles au public\u00bb \u2014 un terme qui n\u2019est pas clairement d\u00e9fini dans le projet de loi relativement aux \u00abensembles de donn\u00e9es\u00bb recueillis par le SCRS, notre agence de renseignement domestique, et qui est d\u00e9fini de fa\u00e7on extraordinairement large pour le CST. Dans les deux cas, \u00abaccessible au public\u00bb est ouvert \u00e0 des interpr\u00e9tations aussi g\u00e9n\u00e9rales que troublantes. En particulier, il n\u2019est pas n\u00e9cessaire que les informations accessibles au public aient \u00e9t\u00e9 obtenues l\u00e9galement. En l\u2019absence de limites efficaces dans la loi, les organismes qui seront mis en place afin d\u2019am\u00e9liorer la reddition de comptes pourront r\u00e9viser ou superviser les activit\u00e9s de surveillance de masse, mais pas n\u00e9cessairement les emp\u00eacher ou les limiter. Le projet de loi C-59 abaisse \u00e9galement le seuil permettant au SCRS de recueillir de l\u2019information sur les Canadien.nes. Alors que la cueillette devait auparavant \u00eatre \u00abn\u00e9cessaire\u00bb, elle n\u2019aurait maintenant qu\u2019\u00e0 \u00eatre \u00abpertinente\u00bb \u00e0 l\u2019exercice des fonctions du SCRS. M\u00eame les donn\u00e9es express\u00e9ment reconnues comme n\u2019\u00e9tant pas directement et imm\u00e9diatement en lien avec des menaces \u00e0 la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du Canada pourront \u00eatre recueillies \u00e0 l\u2019avenir. Il y a eu peu de d\u00e9bats significatifs \u00e0 savoir si ce seuil inf\u00e9rieur est n\u00e9cessaire ou raisonnable compte tenu des objectifs que le gouvernement cherche \u00e0 atteindre.<\/p>\n

Proc\u00e8s et preuves secr\u00e8tes pour les individus sur la liste d\u2019interdiction de vol<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

Il n\u2019a jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9montr\u00e9 que la liste d\u2019interdiction de vol augmente la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 a\u00e9rienne. Le projet de loi C-59 perp\u00e9tue un r\u00e9gime qui limite s\u00e9v\u00e8rement les droits en raison d\u2019un simple soup\u00e7on de dangerosit\u00e9 qui ne peut \u00eatre efficacement contest\u00e9 dans le cadre d\u2019un processus \u00e9quitable et ouvert. Le syst\u00e8me de r\u00e9paration propos\u00e9 par le gouvernement pour ceux et celles qui sont inclus.es, par erreur, sur une liste de personnes faisant l\u2019objet d\u2019un contr\u00f4le de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 renforc\u00e9 (\u00abslow fly list\u00bb) n\u2019aide pas ceux et celles \u00e0 qui ont interdit de voler. Ces personnes sont confront\u00e9es \u00e0 un processus dans lequel elles peuvent l\u00e9galement se voir refuser des informations pertinentes \u00e0 leur cas, se voir refuser l\u2019acc\u00e8s \u00e0 leur propre proc\u00e8s, et dans lequel elles n\u2019ont pas droit \u00e0 un avocat sp\u00e9cial ind\u00e9pendant ayant acc\u00e8s \u00e0 toutes les preuves contre elles. SECU a d\u00e9j\u00e0 recommand\u00e9 un certain nombre de changements \u00e0 la liste d\u2019interdiction de vol, y compris l\u2019utilisation d\u2019avocats sp\u00e9ciaux. Certains d\u2019entre nous, et d\u2019autres, sont all\u00e9s plus loin et ont plaid\u00e9 en faveur de l\u2019abrogation compl\u00e8te de la liste d\u2019interdiction de vol. Les gouvernements successifs ont permis \u00e0 ce syst\u00e8me de durer pendant plus d\u2019une d\u00e9cennie, et il est imp\u00e9ratif que les probl\u00e8mes qu\u2019il pose en mati\u00e8re de droits fondamentaux soient reconnus et r\u00e9gl\u00e9s.<\/p>\n

L<\/strong>\u00e9<\/strong>galisation des cyberattaques par la \u00abNSA du Canada\u00bb, le Centre de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 des t\u00e9l\u00e9communications\u00a0<\/strong>(CST)<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

Nous observons de dangereuses transformations op\u00e9r\u00e9es sur nos agences de \u00abrenseignement\u00bb. Le projet de loi C-59 continue d\u2019autoriser le SCRS \u00e0 exercer des pouvoirs de \u00abperturbation\u00bb et donne maintenant au CST des nouveaux pouvoirs de lancer des cyberattaques contre des personnes, des \u00c9tats, des organisations ou des groupes terroristes \u00e9trangers. Cela comprendrait le piratage, le d\u00e9ploiement de logiciels malveillants et les \u00abcampagnes de d\u00e9sinformation\u00bb. Il existe un danger important de normalisation du piratage parrain\u00e9 par l\u2019\u00c9tat, sans parler de la tension \u00e9vidente lorsque l\u2019agence mandat\u00e9e de prot\u00e9ger notre cyber infrastructure est aussi fortement encourag\u00e9e \u00e0 cacher et exploiter les vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 pour ses propres attaques. Nous avons besoin d\u2019une discussion publique sur les menaces auxquelles ces pouvoirs d\u2019attaque sont cens\u00e9s r\u00e9pondre ainsi que sur les nouvelles menaces auxquelles ils pourraient nous exposer si une attaque canadienne d\u00e9g\u00e9n\u00e9rait en cyberguerre.<\/p>\n

Le gouvernement a dit aux Canadien.nes que la nouvelle loi \u00abr\u00e9parerait\u00bb la loi pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente. Au lieu de cela, nous avons un projet de loi qui r\u00e9pond nominalement \u00e0 certaines pr\u00e9occupations, mais exploite aussi cette opportunit\u00e9 afin d\u2019introduire de nouveaux pouvoirs plus radicaux pour les agences de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale.<\/p>\n

Si l\u2019objectif du projet de loi C-59 est vraiment de \u00abr\u00e9parer\u00bb les lois canadiennes sur la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale, il reste encore beaucoup de travail \u00e0 faire.<\/p>\n

[Sign\u00e9 par \u2014 en ordre alphab\u00e9tique]<\/p>\n

Amnesty International Canada
\nBC Civil Liberties Association
\nBC Freedom of Information and Privacy Association
\nCanadian Association of University Teachers
\nCanadian Civil Liberties Association
\nCanadian Federation of Students
\nCanadian Journalists for Free Expression
\nCanadian Union of Postal Workers
\nCoalition pour la surveillance internationale des libert\u00e9s civiles
\nInter Pares
\nLawyers\u2019 Rights Watch Canada
\nLigue des droits et libert\u00e9s
\nMiningWatch Canada
\nNational Council of Canadian Muslims
\nNational Union of Public and General Employees (NUPGE)
\nOpenMedia
\nPrivacy and Access Council of Canada \u2014\u00a0Conseil du Canada de l\u2019Acc\u00e8s et la vie Priv\u00e9e
\nRideau Institute
\nRocky Mountain Civil Liberties Association
\nSamuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy & Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC)
\nVoix Juives Ind\u00e9pendantes Canada<\/p>\n

Comme individu.e.s:<\/em><\/p>\n

Elizabeth Block, Independent Jewish Voices, Canadian Friends Service Committee
\nJames L. Turk, Director, Centre for Free Expression, Universit\u00e9 Ryerson
\nSharon Polsky, MAPP, Data Protection Advocate & Privacy by Design Ambassador
\nSid Shniad, membre du conseil d\u2019administration, Voix Juives Ind\u00e9pendantes \u2013 Canada<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\t\t\t<\/div> \n\t\t<\/div>\n\t<\/div> \n<\/div><\/div>\n\t\t

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About the Canadian Civil Liberties Association<\/h3>\n
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The CCLA is an independent, non-profit organization with supporters from across the country. Founded in 1964, the CCLA is a national human rights organization committed to defending the rights, dignity, safety, and freedoms of all people in Canada.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

For the Media<\/h3>\n
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For further comments, please contact us at\u00a0media@ccla.org<\/u><\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

For Live Updates<\/h3>\n
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Please keep referring to\u00a0this page<\/a>\u00a0and to our social media platforms. We are on\u00a0Instagram<\/u><\/a>,\u00a0Facebook<\/u><\/a>, Twitter<\/u><\/a> and Blue Sky<\/u><\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\t\t\t<\/div> \n\t\t<\/div>\n\t<\/div> \n<\/div><\/div>\n