{"id":2114,"date":"2020-04-20T08:14:00","date_gmt":"2020-04-20T08:14:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ccla.org\/?p=2114"},"modified":"2021-09-02T19:11:43","modified_gmt":"2021-09-02T19:11:43","slug":"data-surveillance-by-canadian-governments-as-covid-response-cclas-privacy-protection-prescription","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ccla.org\/fr\/privacy\/surveillance-technology\/data-surveillance-by-canadian-governments-as-covid-response-cclas-privacy-protection-prescription\/","title":{"rendered":"Surveillance des donn\u00e9es par les gouvernements canadiens en r\u00e9ponse \u00e0 la COVID\u00a0: la prescription de protection de la vie priv\u00e9e de l'ACLC"},"content":{"rendered":"\n\t\t
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April 20, 2020<\/p>\n

Rt. Hon. Prime Minister of Canada<\/p>\n

Hon. Premiers of Nunavut, North West Territories, Yukon, BC, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, PEI, New Brunswick, Newfoundland & Labrador<\/p>\n

BY EMAIL<\/p>\n

Re: Data Surveillance Technology and COVID-19 Response in Canada<\/strong><\/p>\n

Dear First Ministers,<\/p>\n

We are writing you about the use of technologically-mediated surveillance as a public health response to the COVID pandemic.\u00a0 We are not addressing the use of technology generally by Canadians, voluntarily, nor the urgent need to modernize our privacy laws in and out of a pandemic.<\/p>\n

The present focus of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA), set forth in this letter, is narrowed to future government orders (by order-in-council or like executive instrument) requiring or authorizing the use of surveillance by public officials as part of its COVID19 response, or government orders mandating that residents of a Canadian jurisdiction employ a technology in order to enjoy a pre-COVID19 freedom.<\/p>\n

Canadian governments have the opportunity and responsibility to learn from the approaches of other countries. To be sure, there are no magic bullets \u2014 not in big data, not in automated decision-making about individual risk, and not in automated contact tracing.[1]\u00a0\u00a0This is not to suggest that technology can never support public-health led efforts.\u00a0 However, involuntary collection of information by governments remains unwarranted today and any requests for voluntary participation should be considered carefully.\u00a0 Nor should existing privacy laws be suspended for proposed public surveillance.<\/p>\n

Of particular concern to CCLA is Canada\u2019s lack of legislative and executive proficiency with data privacy.\u00a0 For some time, Canada has fallen behind other jurisdictions like the European Union or US states like California, when it comes to data privacy laws, regulation and security.\u00a0 To legalize data surveillance in a pandemic is therefore a high risk gamble with Canadian privacy rights.\u00a0 We urge strict scrutiny of the efficacy of any new technological solutions to COVID19.\u00a0 If pursued, they must accord with constitutional principles of due process, liberty, equality and privacy.<\/p>\n

Accordingly, CCLA proposes that the following recommendations apply to any executive order or law enacted as a response to COVID19:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Data surveillance only be undertaken as a\u00a0last resort<\/strong>\u00a0and only where\n
      \n
    1. there is meaningful\u00a0consent<\/strong>\u00a0by the individuals concerned, even where a legal exception to consent applies (such as lawful authority and public notice);<\/li>\n
    2. the\u00a0objective<\/strong>\u00a0of the measure being undertaken is legitimate (such as \u201cflattening the curve\u201d or otherwise minimizing the spread of the virus);<\/li>\n
    3. the measure is demonstrably\u00a0necessary<\/strong>, based on authorized public health evidence, not conjecture;<\/li>\n
    4. the measure is likely to be\u00a0effective<\/strong>\u00a0(that is, the extent to which the measure will achieve, or will likely achieve, its objective);<\/li>\n
    5. other solutions less privacy-invasive than the measure do not exist, and the measure\u2019s intrusion on personal privacy is\u00a0proportionate<\/strong>\u00a0to the evidence-based public health benefit of the measure.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      We will elaborate and add to (b)-(e), below.<\/p>\n

        \n
      1. Privacy Commissioners<\/strong>\u00a0for the jurisdiction must be engaged prior to enactment and during implementation of any public health surveillance measures.<\/li>\n
      2. Data collection must be grounded in evidence of public health\u00a0necessity<\/strong>, pursuant to a\u00a0Chief Medical Officer Data \u2018Warrant,\u2019<\/strong>\u00a0or information request: e., a pre-condition for the creation or adoption of technological solutions for information gaps should be a formal written request by the Chief Medical Officer of the jurisdiction, \u00a0setting forth precisely why it is necessary to obtain this data, that such data is otherwise unavailable, and that the official believes the data is in fact obtainable, as well as that data\u2019s intended usage by public health officials.<\/li>\n
      3. Proportionality<\/strong>\u00a0must be certified through a legal balancing of means and ends, by the Chief Legal Officer of a jurisdiction, who would need to set out in writing just how the proportionality test is met for any particular use of data surveillance of individuals, including: the compelling objective set forth by the Chief Medical Officer\u2019s Data Warrant, the rational connection between compelling objective and proportionate response; and further affirmation that the means infringes upon privacy rights as little as possible, with reference to why alternative measures are inadequate (i.e., if the information can be obtained by the presence of by-law or police officers, then there is no need for data surveillance).<\/li>\n
      4. An\u00a0Impact Detriment Analysis for the Vulnerable<\/strong>\u00a0must accompany any executive order, but particularly one involving surveillance, as an aspect of achieving proportionality, with input provided by human rights commissions. To ensure that the most vulnerable are not an afterthought, as a precondition to any government order, the government ought to disclose its detrimental impact upon vulnerable and marginalized populations, including identifying and publicizing measures which will be taken to mitigate such impact.<\/li>\n
      5. Firewall public health data for public health purposes,<\/strong>\u00a0and away from police and public order officials. No data arising from COVID19 responses should be accessible to police, peace officers, by-law officials, Canadian Border Security or corrections officials, nor may any of it be used as evidence in any legal proceeding unrelated to a public health violation. Storage for data collected via emergency-specific surveillance must accord with privacy laws applicable to health records, with strict access controls, and mandated destruction of that data once the emergency has abated.<\/li>\n
      6. Time limit<\/strong>\u00a0any data collection to the duration of the COVID19 emergency orders of a given jurisdiction.<\/li>\n
      7. Enhance\u00a0transparency and accountability<\/strong>\u00a0by a requirement that the chief public health officers and chief legal officers appear before a legislative committee (online or otherwise) as witnesses for questioning by legislative members prior to the implementation of surveillance measures.<\/li>\n
      8. Install\u00a0independent oversight<\/strong>\u00a0of the process and its implementation. For example, a jurisdiction could empower their Privacy Commissioners, or appoint an independent surveillance ombudsman, accountable to the jurisdiction\u2019s legislative assembly, to oversee the foregoing process, to receive public complaints and provide recourse for rights infringements, to regularly report to the public as to their observations and the nature and number of complaints received, and eventually report to the elected assembly within a yearly quarter after the executive authorization or order is enacted.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

        In this crisis, our use of technology to improve public health must be grounded in evidence of effectiveness, and an understanding of what technology can do, and what it cannot. We insist that no data-driven initiatives in Canada serve to discriminate, stigmatize, or deny fundamental rights to people in Canada.<\/p>\n

        CCLA is a non-partisan, independent non-profit founded in 1964.\u00a0 We have stood up to power in hundreds of Canadian courts and legislatures.\u00a0 Our goal during this pandemic is to prevent civil liberties infringements where feasible, hold public authorities to account, and focus upon those most vulnerable to abuse of power.<\/p>\n

        [1]\u00a0As a Director at the Singapore Ministry of Communications and Information puts it: \u201cYou cannot \u201cbig data\u201d your way out of a \u201cno data\u201d situation. Period.\u201d Jason Bay was the product lead for Singapore\u2019s TraceTogether contact tracing application. No Bluetooth contact tracing system is ready to replace manual contact tracing, he has made clear, adding that automated notifications are unadvisable, even when developing an application in close coordination with local public health authorities, as was the case in Singapore. https:\/\/blog.gds-gov.tech\/automated-contact-tracing-is-not-a-coronavirus-panacea-57fb3ce61d98<\/a><\/p>\n

        Michael Bryant
        \nExecutive Director & General Counsel<\/p>\n

        Brenda McPhail, PhD.
        \nDirector of Privacy, Technology & Surveillance Project<\/p>\n\t<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\t\t\t<\/div> \n\t\t<\/div>\n\t<\/div> \n<\/div><\/div>\n\t\t

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        About the Canadian Civil Liberties Association<\/h3>\n
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        The CCLA is an independent, non-profit organization with supporters from across the country. Founded in 1964, the CCLA is a national human rights organization committed to defending the rights, dignity, safety, and freedoms of all people in Canada.<\/p>\n\t<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

        For the Media<\/h3>\n
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        For further comments, please contact us at\u00a0media@ccla.org<\/u><\/a>.<\/p>\n\t<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

        For Live Updates<\/h3>\n
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        Please keep referring to\u00a0this page<\/a>\u00a0and to our social media platforms. We are on\u00a0Instagram<\/u><\/a>,\u00a0Facebook<\/u><\/a>, Twitter<\/u><\/a> and Blue Sky<\/u><\/a>.<\/p>\n\t<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\t\t\t<\/div> \n\t\t<\/div>\n\t<\/div> \n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\t\t\t<\/div> \n\t\t<\/div>\n\t<\/div> \n<\/div><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

        Nous vous \u00e9crivons au sujet de l'utilisation de la surveillance \u00e0 m\u00e9diation technologique comme r\u00e9ponse de sant\u00e9 publique \u00e0 la pand\u00e9mie de COVID. Nous ne traitons pas de l'utilisation de la technologie en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral par les Canadiens, volontairement, ni du besoin urgent de moderniser nos lois sur la protection de la vie priv\u00e9e pendant et hors d'une pand\u00e9mie. <\/p>","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":1874,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[27,11,88],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2114","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-covid-19","category-privacy","category-surveillance-technology"],"yoast_head":"\nData Surveillance by Canadian Governments as COVID Response: CCLA's Privacy Protection Prescription - CCLA<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/ccla.org\/fr\/intimite\/technologie-de-surveillance\/data-surveillance-by-canadian-governments-as-covid-response-cclas-privacy-protection-prescription\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"fr_CA\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Data Surveillance by Canadian Governments as COVID Response: CCLA's Privacy Protection Prescription - CCLA\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"We are writing you about the use of technologically-mediated surveillance as a public health response to the COVID pandemic. 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