Police Accountability

• Introduction

• Major Concerns

• Specific Issues

• Background

• Quick Links

Over a year and a half after the Canadian Civil Liberties Association’s original G20 complaint, the Commission for Public Complaints Against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“the Commssion”) has released its final report into RCMP conduct during the 2010 G8 and G20 summits.

CCLA welcomes the long-awaited report as an important step in the struggle to achieve post-G20 accountability and transparency.  The report provides new information that bolsters a number of concerns raised by the CCLA in the wake of the G20 and strengthens the call for answers from the outstanding review processes focused on the conduct of the Toronto Police Service (“TPS”) and the Ontario Provincial Police (“OPP”).  The report also makes several key recommendations, which CCLA strongly urges the RCMP to act upon immediately.  CCLA is also concerned about some of the report’s findings which approve of RCMP conduct despite the RCMP’s use of police tactics contrary to RCMP policy, RCMO planning failures and insufficient documentation on questionable arrests.

Major Concerns

Several of the disclosures in the report shed new light on police conduct and raise significant concerns regarding the propriety of police actions during the G20 summit:

• A chaotic police command environment at Queen and Spadina, unclear policies and procedures

The report reveals a chaotic police command environment at Queen and Spadina on Sunday June 27, 2010.  The RCMP officers who arrived at the intersection could not locate the on-site commanding officer – an OPP member –  for nearly two hours. Officers on scene expressed concern about the orders to box in the intersection and about whether individuals being detained had been told they were under arrest.  The RCMP Commander on scene had questioned why people were still being held, given that the G20 summit was effectively over, and was told that the TPS wanted “everyone” arrested.  Despite the fact that the RCMP remained bound by their own policies and procedures which did not allow for ‘kettling’ crowds without an exit, for nearly two hours the RCMP assisted in containing the intersection at the apparent direction of the Toronto Police Service.  The report confirms that senior RCMP command had expected RCMP Public Order Units to operate within established RCMP practices and policies. Although the RCMP Commander on scene was concerned and questioned the orders, and at least one senior RCMP officer was likely aware that the kettling was taking place, this information was not relayed to the RCMP command centres.

• RCMP officers arrested five at Queen and Spadina, including two plain-clothes police officers.

The report also confirms that RCMP officers conducted five arrests while containing the crowd at Queen and Spadina.  Insufficient notes were kept, and the Commission did not have enough information to make a finding on the reasonableness of these arrests.  “The results of the investigation into these arrests raise a number of concerns,” said Abby Deshman Director of the CCLA’s Public Safety Program.  “The RCMP stated that these individuals were arrested because the RCMP officers on scene thought they posed a risk to tactical forces – one person was drunk, for example, and another was thought to be carrying a weapon.  Unbeknownst to the on site RCMP officers, two of the five people they arrested were actually plain-clothes police officers. What were these officers doing that led the RCMP to single them out for arrest? How are we to assess police assertions that crowds contained individuals posing a security risk, when some of those identified as suspicious were themselves police officers?”

• Lack of planning, lack of accountability

Although the Commission found that the RCMP planning process was thorough and comprehensive, CCLA notes that several crucial planning deficiencies were identified in the investigation.  “Planning for policing must include planning for police accountability,” said Abby Deshman.  “The report shows that officers’ notes regarding arrests were inadequate, the RCMP relinquished control of crucial information to other agencies, and inadequate procedures for organizing and identifying relevant documentation caused significant delays in the review process.”

There was also inadequate prior planning regarding what would happen if RCMP officers received orders from another police force to take actions contrary to RCMP policy and procedure. “The RCMP should have been alerted to this possibility,” said Abby Deshman.  “It was well-known that, while the TPS and OPP had approved the use of ‘sonic cannons’ for public order events, RCMP policy explicitly rejected its use in this setting.  Ensuring that police protocols and accountability regimes remain functional in large policing events should be a core part of the planning process, not an afterthought.”

• Further investigation of undercover operations necessary

Specific Issues

Upon review of the Commission’s findings, CCLA believes it is important to highlight the following elements of the Final Report:

1. RCMP involvement in Queen and Spadina kettling, June 27, 2010

• Upon arriving on scene at 5:52 pm the RCMP Public Order Unit (POU) Commander was unable to locate the on-site tactical commander, an OPP Commander.  The OPP Commander was not located until nearly two hours later. [footnote 1]
• The RCMP POU Commander was ordered to “box in the protesters, as they were all under arrest for conspiracy to commit mischief.”[footnote 2]  The Commander attempted to confirm these orders with the Toronto Police Service Major Incident Command Centre, as he “was attempting to understand whether the decision to make the mass arrests was based on articulable grounds.  He was also concerned with the order to box in, as neither he nor the troop Non-Commissioned Officer (who was a seasoned tactical troop member) had previously employed this technique. According to RCMP POU policy and training, crowds should be provided an egress route.”[footnote 3]
• Despite the fact that ‘kettling’ was contrary to RCMP policy and training, the RCMP nevertheless proceeded to assist in boxing in the intersection without providing an egress route.[footnote 4]
• The RCMP Commander reported that some RCMP members “expressed concern about whether those being detained in the intersection had been told that they were under arrest. … The Commission interviewed a number of persons in the kettle; some indicated that they did not hear such warnings, while other said that they did but that the warning came after the kettle was already formed, leaving the crowd no way out.  The Commission was unable to confirm whether the warning had been provided and at what time, as the RCMP did not give the warning, nor were any RCMP members present when the warning was reportedly issued.”[footnote 5]
• Between 6 pm and around 8 pm RCMP officers arrested five individuals who were within the kettle.  The RCMP POU Commander on site stated that “The five arrested individuals were singled out because it was felt that they may pose a risk to the tactical troop.”[footnote 6]  Although the RCMP did not know it at the time, it was later revealed that two of the five individuals arrested were plain-clothes police officers.   The Report finds that there was “insufficient information available to enable the Commission to assess the appropriateness of the arrests made by the RCMP POU.”[footnote 7]
• At about 8 pm, the RCMP POU Commander questioned the OPP Commander “why individuals continued to be held, as the G20 Summit was nearly over.  He was told that Toronto Police Service Command (i.e. MICC) wanted everyone arrested.”[footnote 8]

2. Propriety of undercover operations require further examination

• Although the Commission was able to review RCMP policy and procedures for intelligence collection, its “ability to examine the [undercover] operations in depth was circumscribed by the necessity of avoiding any effect on the ongoing litigation and criminal trials. … subsequent to its investigation, criminal matters were resolved. Given that the resolution did not include any judicial scrutiny of whether the operations were carried out in an appropriate manner, the Commission is considering whether further review of these operations is required.”[footnote 9]

3. Planning process needs to incorporate planning for accountability

• Although the Commission found that the RCMP planning process was “robust and thorough,”[footnote 10] it nonetheless recommended that “the RCMP more effectively integrate into its planning function for major events an awareness of the possibility of ex post facto review and adopt commensurate document organization practices and guidelines for appropriate disclosure.”[footnote 11]
• As a result of RCMP involvement in crowd containment actions which were contrary to RCMP police and procedure, the Commission also recommended that “the RCMP make best efforts to establish, together with its partners, clear operational guidelines prior to an event where integrated policing will occur to ensure consistency of application”[footnote 12]

4. Previous RCMP reports into individual G20 complaints “not fulsome”[footnote 13]

• The RCMP previously issued several identical reports dismissing several individual complaints regarding the Queen and Spadina kettling incident.  The Commission found that this RCMP response was “not fulsome in that it fails to address the complaint about ‘boxing in’ and why this is contrary to RCMP policy, and also in its approach to the jurisdiction and command decision issue.  As discussed above, there is at least some onus on the RCMP to ensure that any actions taken – even at the command of another police force – have a reasonable basis in law and some justification from a policing perspective.”[footnote 14]

Background

On October 18, 2010 the Canadian Civil Liberties Association lodged a formal complaint with the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP regarding a number of issues that arose from the Toronto G20.  Specifically, the CCLA requested that the Commission examine:

• The RCMP’s role in G8 and G20 security planning, and specifically the decision to erect a fence isolating a large portion of downtown Toronto;
• The extent of RCMP infiltration and surveillance before and during the G8 and G20 summits;
• Use of force, mass detention and arrest during the Summits, with a specific focus on any RCMP involvement in five specific incidents of concern; and
• Conditions at the Eastern Ave detention centre.

On November 5, 2010, the Commission announced that it would conduct a public interest investigation into RCMP involvement in the four areas outlined above.

The Canadian Civil Liberties Association has been calling for a public inquiry into the G20 since June 2010. Specifically, CCLA has been asking for a public inquiry to look into some of the aspects that no single review to date has been able to fully evaluate because of the limited scope of their mandate – the interplay between various police forces from different jurisdictions, as well as issues of chain of command, communications, training and leadership that lead to the mass violation of civil liberties we witnessed. The significant gaps in the Commission’s Final Report, many of which point directly to TPS and OPP conduct, highlight the need for a comprehensive, inter-jurisdictional review. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association believes that the role of the Crown in managing the prosecution of charges should also be examined, including the imposition of bail conditions that limited democratic rights.

Quick Links

>> Click here to read the Commission’s Final Report on the Public Interest Investigation into RCMP Member Conduct Related to the 2010 G8 and G20 Summits
>> Click here to read the CCLA’s October 18, 2010 complaint to the CPC
>> Click here to read CCLA and NUPGE’s February 2011 report “Breach of the Peace”
>> Click here to read CCLA’s interim report from June 2010

 Footnotes

1. Commission for Public Complaints Against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, ‘Public Interest Investigation into RCMP Member Conduct Related to the 2010 G8 and G20 Summits: Final Report” (May 2012), pg. 37.
2. Ibid., pg. 36.
3. Ibid., pg. 36.
4. Ibid., pg. 36.
5. Ibid., pg. 37.
6. Ibid., pg. 38.
7. Ibid., pg. 38.
8. Ibid., pg. 37.
9. Ibid., pg. 29-30.
10. Ibid., Finding No. 1, pg. 17.
11. Ibid., Recommendation No. 1, pg. 5.
12. Ibid., Recommendation No. 7, pg. 39.
13. Ibid., pg. 41.
14. Ibid., pg. 41.